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Science begins with the question, what do I want to know? Science becomes science, however, 
only when this question is justified and the appropriate methodology is chosen for answering 
the research question. Research question should precede the other questions; methods 
should be chosen according to the research question and not vice versa. Modern quantitative 
psychology has accepted method as primary; research questions are adjusted to the methods. 
For understanding thinking in modern quantitative psychology, two epistemologies should 
be distinguished: structural-systemic that is based on Aristotelian thinking, and associative-
quantitative that is based on Cartesian–Humean thinking. The first aims at understanding the 
structure that underlies the studied processes; the second looks for identification of cause–effect 
relationships between the events with no possible access to the understanding of the structures 
that underlie the processes. Quantitative methodology in particular as well as mathematical 
psychology in general, is useless for answering questions about structures and processes 
that underlie observed behaviors. Nevertheless, quantitative science is almost inevitable in 
a situation where the systemic-structural basis of behavior is not well understood; all sorts 
of applied decisions can be made on the basis of quantitative studies. In order to proceed, 
psychology should study structures; methodologically, constructive experiments should be 
added to observations and analytic experiments.
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It can be said that modern psychology is more advanced than 
science of Vygotsky’s time; perhaps the questions asked in the mod-
ern science are meaningful. This opinion, however, may be wrong. 
One source of wrong questions about the studied phenomena is 
unsatisfactory answer to the last question – when answers to first 
three questions do not agree one with another. In this paper I am 
going to suggest that psychology asks “wrong” questions far too 
often. The problem is related to the mismatch in answers to the 
first and third question. Specifically, quantitative methodology that 
dominates psychology of today is not appropriate for achieving 
understanding of mental phenomena, psyche.
The number of substantial problems with quantitative meth-
ods brought out by scholars is increasing every year. Already one 
observation could make scientists cautious. The questions provided 
above are in a certain order – first we should have a question about 
the phenomenon and only then the appropriate method for finding 
an answer should be looked for. Substantial part of modern psy-
chology follows the opposite order of decisions – first it is decided to 
use quantitative methods, and the question about the phenomenon 
is already formulated in the language of data analysis. Between 1940 
and 1955, statistical data analysis became the indispensable tool 
for hypothesis testing; with this change of scientific methodology, 
statistical methods began to turn into theories of mind. Instead of 
looking for theory that perhaps can be elaborated with the help of 
statistical tools, statistical tools began to determine the shape of 
theories (Gigerenzer, 1991, 1993).
For instance, a researcher may ask, how many factors emerge 
in the analysis of personality or intelligence test results. But why 
to look for the number of factors if personality or intelligence is 
Science begins with questions. Everybody can have questions, and 
even answers to them. What makes science special is its method of 
answering questions. Therefore a scientist must ask questions both 
about the phenomenon to be understood and about the method. 
There are actually not one or two but four principal questions 
that should be asked by every scientist when conducting studies 
(Toomela, 2010b):
1.  What do I want to know, what is my research question?
2.  Why I want to have an answer to this question?
3.  With what specific research procedures (methodology in the 
strict sense of the term) can I answer my question?
4.  Are the answers to three first questions complementary, do 
they make a coherent theoretically justified whole?
First, there should be a question about some phenomenon that needs 
an answer. Next, the need for an answer should be justified – in 
  science it is quite possible to ask “wrong” questions, which answers 
do  not  help  understanding  the  studied  phenomena.  Vygotsky 
(1982a) gave in his colorful language an ironic example of answer-
ing scientifically wrong questions:
One can multiply the number of citizens of Paraguay with the 
number of versts [an obsolete Russian unit of length] from Earth 
to Sun and divide the result with the average length of life of an 
elephant and conduct this whole operation without a flaw even 
in one number; and yet the number found in the operation can 
confuse anybody who would like to know the national income of 
that country
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What are the (statistical) causes of relationships  
betWeen variables?
Thurstone suggested that the object of factor analysis is to discover 
the mental faculties. It is interesting that for him factor analysis 
alone would have never been sufficient for proving that a new fac-
ulty has been discovered – he held a position that results of fac-
tor analysis must be supported by the experimental observations. 
In another work he found that in some fields of studies tests are 
used that are not tests at all – “They are only questionnaires in 
which the subject controls the answers completely. It would prob-
ably be very fruitful to explore the domain of temperament with 
experimental tests instead of questionnaires.” (Thurstone, 1948, 
p. 406). So, Thurstone would very likely reject the modern prac-
tice to study many psychological phenomena – personality, values, 
attitudes, mental states, etc. – with questionnaires alone as it is 
often done now. There seems to be no theory that would justify 
studies of the structure of mind only by questionnaires. Without 
a theory that links subjectively controlled patterns of answers to 
objective structure of mind the results of all such studies are not 
grounded. Thorough analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of 
the current paper.
We can ask, what was the general question Thurstone aimed 
at answering with the help of factor analysis? Thurstone was not 
asking how mental faculties operate; he was looking for identifi-
cation of what he called abilities, i.e., traits (which are attributes 
of individuals) which are defined by what an individual can do 
(Thurstone, 1935, p. 48).
The same questions about identification of “abilities” under-
lie the use of not only factor analysis but other covariation-based 
statistical data-analysis procedures as well. Here it is feasible to go 
deeper into the roots of introducing quantitative data-analysis into 
sciences. Methods for calculating correlation coefficients entered 
sciences somewhere in the middle of the 19th century but became 
popular with the works of Pearson (cf., 1896). He formulated the 
tasks of statistical data analysis in the following way:
One of the most frequent tasks of the statistician, the physicist, and 
the engineer, is to represent a series of observations or measurements 
by a concise and suitable formula. Such a formula may either express 
a physical hypothesis, or on the other hand be merely empirical, 
i.e., it may enable us to represent by a few well selected constants 
a wide range of experimental or observational data. In the latter 
case it serves not only for purposes of interpolation, but frequently 
suggests new physical concepts or statistical constants.
 ( Pearson, 1902, p. 266).
I think it is especially noteworthy – formula that is searched for, 
represents observations or measurements – i.e., variables. This fact 
is so obvious that consequences that follow from it are usually not 
thought through. The main problem related to use of observa-
tions and measurements is that they do not necessarily reflect the 
reality objectively; they are subjective interpretations of the world 
by the researcher. This is especially true in the situation when the 
observation – of external behavior, in psychology – is supposed to 
reflect operation of the hidden from direct observation construct, 
mental faculty. Thurstone acknowledged that externally similar 
behaviors can be based on internally different mechanisms; and he 
studied? We would guess here that the original question may be 
something like, is it possible to identify distinguishable compo-
nents in the structure of personality or intelligence? However, the 
decision to use factor analysis for that purpose must be justified 
before this method is chosen. This justification seems to be miss-
ing; it is only a hypothesis – ungrounded hypothesis – that fac-
tor analysis is an appropriate tool for identifying distinct mental 
processes that underlie behavioral data (filling in a questionnaire 
is behavior). The problems emerge already with the determina-
tion of the number of factors to retain. There are formal and 
substantial criteria for that. Formal decisions are based on Kaiser’s 
criterion, Cattel’s scree test, Velicer’s Minimum Average Partial 
test, or Horn’s parallel analysis. There is no evidence that any of 
these criteria is actually suitable for distinguishing the number of 
distinct processes that underlie behavior. Researchers also decide 
the number of factors on the basis of comprehensibility – the solu-
tion which generates the most comprehensible factor structure is 
chosen. But this substantial criterion is always used after apply-
ing formal criteria; nobody starts from the possibility that all, 
say, 248 items of an inventory correspond to 248 distinct mental 
processes. The number of factors usually retained – from two to 
six or seven – seems to correspond to processing limitations of 
the researcher’s working memory rather than to true structure 
of the mind.
In this paper, epistemological issues that underlie quantitative 
methods used in psychology are discussed. I suggest that, regard-
less of the research area in psychology, mathematical procedures 
of any kind cannot answer questions about the structure of mind. 
The discussion focuses primarily on the statistical methodology 
as used in psychology today; yet there are fundamental problems 
inherent to other kinds of mathematical approaches as well. My 
intention is not to suggest that scientific studies of mind should 
reject mathematical approaches. Rather, it should be made clear, 
which questions can be answered with the help of mathematical 
methods and which cannot.
Which questions can and Which cannot be 
ansWered by the statistical data analysis 
procedures?
We should look for reasons to use statistical data analysis into 
the works of those, who introduced quantitative methodology 
into sciences in general and psychology in particular. Today, as a 
rule, users and developers of statistical data analysis procedures 
do not ask any more which questions can and which cannot 
be answered with the help of those procedures. Scholars who 
introduced mathematical procedures, however, made it clear, 
what kinds of answers they are looking for. We will see that these 
scholars would reject the questions answered by statistical pro-
cedures today for reasons that are largely ignored without any 
scientific reason by modern researchers. One of the most influ-
ential figures in introducing factor analysis into psychology was 
Thurstone. There are several ideas in his fundamental work The 
vectors of mind that are worthy of attention (Thurstone, 1935). 
These ideas, in the most part, underlie the use of not only fac-
tor analysis but the use of all forms of covariation-based data 
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limits on the questions that can be ansWered With the help 
of statistical data analysis procedures
Statistical theories reflect regularities only in appearances
Pearson was fully aware of the limits of statistical theories. Theory 
that looks for mechanisms should be clearly distinguished from 
pure descriptions of regularities in superficial observations; statis-
tical laws… “have nothing whatever to do with any physiological 
hypothesis” (Pearson, 1904, p. 55). According to him, “the statisti-
cal view of inheritance is not at basis a theory, but a description 
of observed facts, with which any physiological theory must be in 
accord” (Pearson, 1903–1904, p. 509). We know from the modern 
biological theory of inheritance, how correct he was: the statistical 
laws discovered by him had really nothing to do with the discovery of 
the structure of DNA, even though they may have directed biologists 
to look for possible substrate of inheritance. It is also noteworthy 
that, contrary to Pearson, after discovering the structure of DNA 
and explaining the biological mechanisms of inheritance, there was 
no need at all to check whether this theory of structure accords with 
Pearson’s laws or not; these laws became irrelevant for the theory.
Thurstone was looking for discovering mental faculties with 
the help of the factor analysis. Similarly with Pearson, he did not 
assume that discovered faculties can be directly related to mental 
operations; he did not assume one-to-one correspondence between 
observed behaviors and mechanisms that underlie them:
The attitudes of people on a controversial social issue have been 
appraised by allocating each person to a point in a linear continuum 
as regards his favorable or unfavorable affect toward the psychological 
object. Some social scientists have objected because two individuals 
may have the same attitude score toward, say, pacifism, and yet be 
totally different in their backgrounds and in the causes of their similar 
social views. If such critics were consistent, they would object also to 
the statement that two men have identical incomes, for one of them 
earns when the other one steals. They should also object to the state-
ment that two men are of the same height. The comparison should be 
held invalid because one of the men is fat and the other is thin.
 ( Thurstone, 1935, p. 47)
It was shown above that Thurstone was not asking how mental 
faculties operate; he was looking for just identification of abilities. 
There can be, thus, an ability to make money; and this ability is 
treated the same independently of whether the income is made by 
earning or by stealing. Statistical procedures used by Thurstone aim 
at discovering an ability to make income, for instance, but there 
would be no clue as to the mechanisms of the income-making. So, 
if there is a phenomenon like income in the world, perhaps factor 
analysis would be helpful to discover it.
There are, however, reasons to disagree partly with Thurstone’s 
interpretation of this procedure. He suggested, for example, that 
incomes based on different sources should be considered to be differ-
ent if social scientists were fully consistent; he disagreed with this idea. 
Essentially, Thurstone seems to assume that it is possible to isolate the 
phenomenon from the world and perhaps study it after isolation as a 
thing in itself. In the real world, however, a thing that exists completely 
isolated from the world would be unknowable in principle, because we 
know the world only being in relation with it. Income is by definition 
the amount of money or its equivalent received during a period of 
time. If we analyze the phenomenon of money, we discover that it is 
was only interested in finding formulas that express   regularities in 
the external behavior. Pearson essentially did the same; he assumed 
that with the help of correlations, it is possible to get closer to iden-
tification of different causes of external regularities. Pearson also 
did not aim at describing how these causes operate. He, similarly 
with Thurstone, was looking for identifying regularities (faculties 
in Thurstone’s terms) in the observable cause → effect chains with-
out claiming that unique cause, hidden from direct observation, 
is necessarily identified. This limitation for the aim of statistical 
analyses can be found in many of his works, as in the following 
passage, for instance:
We shall now assume that the sizes of this complex of organs are 
determined by a great variety of independent contributory causes, 
for example, magnitudes of other organs not in the complex, vari-
ations in environment, climate, nourishment, physical training, 
various ancestral influences, and innumerable other causes, which 
cannot be individually observed or their effects measured.
 ( Pearson, 1896, p. 262).
When Pearson correlated sizes of organs he was, thus, aware that 
mathematical formulas that reflect certain commonalities in the 
variation of two variables do not reflect unique roles of individual 
contributory causes; these causes determine the measured sizes in 
ways that are not known.
The general form of the question Pearson answered with sta-
tistical analyses can be formulated: What is the value of a certain 
variable when we know a value of another variable that is corre-
lated to the first? An example of this kind of use was provided by 
Pearson when he reconstructed “the parts of an extinct race from 
a knowledge of a size of a few organs or bones, when complete 
measurements have been or can be made for an allied and still 
extant race.” (Pearson, 1899, p. 170).
Correlation, in this case, can be understood as a representa-
tion of some abstract cause which “makes” variables to covary. 
Thus, the same question can be reformulated: Is it possible to 
discover an abstract cause-like communality of different variables 
that is expressed as covariation? I think Pearson was very clear 
in understanding that correlation reflects covariations of appear-
ances; the true underlying causes of covariation, the mechanisms 
that determine how the covariation emerges, cannot be known 
with statistical procedures – there are many independent causal 
agents operating, “which cannot be individually observed or their 
effects measured.” At the same time, he could interpret covariations 
between variables in non-mathematical terms; he interpreted them 
as reflecting common cause. For instance, he concluded on the 
basis of statistical analyses that fertility and fecundity are inherited 
characteristics (Pearson et al., 1899) – he, thus, suggested that some 
non-mathematical factor, inheritance, underlies the correlations 
he discovered.
Thurstone went a step further and suggested – it is possible to 
find formulas for expressing patterns of covariations; factor analysis 
identifies “faculties” or “abilities” that underlie correlation among 
several variables simultaneously. He was also clear that factor analy-
sis expresses relationships between appearances; possible differ-
ences in internal mechanisms that may underlie externally similar 
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Founders of the statistical theorizing denied such possibility by means 
of quantitative data analysis that is based on analysis of covariations 
between variables; perhaps they missed something fundamental that 
makes possible what they declared not to be possible? Perhaps it 
became possible to discover, for instance, by means of factor analysis 
the structure of mind as it is, not just as a man-made law that reflects 
only superficial covariations between observed events?
There are reasons to suggest that quantitative tools are not appro-
priate for this aim. Statistical data analysis procedures used in modern 
quantitative psychology are based on postulates that do not contradict 
the aims of statistical theorizing Thurstone, Pearson and their follow-
ers had. The same postulates, however, are incompatible with the aims 
of those who look for properties of mind as it is and not only for the 
generalizations that can be made about any kind of observations.
Postulate  of  quantitative  measurement.  Modern  psychology 
must postulate that variables that are entered into analyses can be 
interpreted in terms of underlying mechanisms. Otherwise inter-
pretation of the results of analyses in terms of those mechanisms 
would not be valid. Reasons to doubt whether this postulate is 
actually true, emerge already from the Pearson’s works. Namely, 
he extended statistical theorizing to characteristics that cannot be 
quantified (Pearson and Lee, 1900). For Thurstone and Pearson, it 
was not a problem that measured variables represent events with 
essentially unknown underlying causes because they did not aim 
at understanding those causes; they just looked for descriptions of 
statistical regularities in different observations. So for them even 
the question whether a variable represents something that can be 
quantified or not, was not an issue. But it must be one of the first 
problems to solve if physical or psychological reality is aimed to 
understand – what exactly is encoded in variables?
Psychology of today can be called pathological – many hypoth-
eses are accepted as true without attempts being made to test them; 
the hypothesis that psychological attributes are quantitative is not 
tested in psychology of today (Michell, 2000). Worse, there are all 
reasons to suggest that attributes that are “measured” in psychology 
cannot be measured, because they are not quantitative (e.g., Essex 
and Smythe, 1999; Michell, 2010). Therefore, covariations between 
variables have no meaningful interpretation as to the underlying 
mechanisms in principle, because different levels of variables may 
denote qualitatively different phenomena. This alone would be suf-
ficient for rejecting interpretations of quantitative analyses about 
underlying mechanisms. But there is more – as Thurstone also 
pointed out – externally similar behaviors can rely on internally 
different mechanisms. Thus even the same level on some variable 
may represent qualitatively different phenomena in different cases. 
It follows that under such circumstances no quantitative procedure 
can distinguish qualitatively different mechanisms that may under-
lie externally the same behavior – the variable that encodes behavior 
independently of differences in (psychic) mechanisms simply does 
not contain information about mechanism (Toomela, 2008).
If a researcher would be interested in distinguishing the psycho-
logical mechanisms of behavior, other procedures would be needed. 
A researcher would invent different methods to reveal differences 
in externally similar behaviors. For instance, in many situations it 
could be possible just to ask directly from the person a justification 
for his or her behavior. It is important that the methods that must 
a relational phenomenon. Money is a medium of exchange and unit 
of account; money, thus, is a phenomenon that mediates certain eco-
nomic relationships. Outside the society, money ceases to be money; 
it becomes just a physical object. Societies determine relations toward 
money in much more complex ways than just in economic terms. For 
instance, in modern democratic societies it would be legally possible 
to confiscate money if the money turns out to be stolen; but there 
are no societies where money would be confiscated because it was 
earned. So, the incomes of two men, for one who earns and for the 
other who steals, are not the same indeed.
Thurstone would likely – and fairly – reject this critique by tell-
ing that “Every scientific construct limits itself to specified variables 
without any pretense to cover those aspects of a class of phenomena 
about which it has said nothing” (Thurstone, 1935, p. 47). By saying 
that a factor represents some isolated characteristic of the studied 
phenomenon, Thurstone retains consistency of his approach. And 
this is exactly where the weakness of statistical theories lies: these 
theories are about regularities in appearances with no necessary 
connection to the underlying mechanisms. Thurstone, similarly 
with Pearson, was fully aware of this limitation:
This volume is concerned with methods of discovering and iden-
tifying significant categories in psychology and in other social sci-
ences. […] It is the faith of all science that an unlimited number of 
phenomena can be comprehended in terms of a limited number of 
concepts or ideal constructs. […] The constructs in terms of which 
natural phenomena are comprehended are man-made inventions. To 
discover a scientific law is merely to discover that a man-made scheme 
serves to unify, and thereby to simplify, comprehension of a certain 
class of natural phenomena. A scientific law is not to be thought of 
as having an independent existence which some scientist is fortunate 
to stumble upon. A scientific law is not a part of nature. It is only 
a way of comprehending nature. […] While the ideal constructs of 
science do not imply physical reality, they do not deny the possibility 
of some degree of correspondence with physical reality. But this is a 
philosophical problem that is quite outside the domain of science.
 ( Thurstone, 1935, p. 44).
If biologists would have accepted this view, there would be no mod-
ern science of inheritance, for example. Modern biological theories do 
not look for “some degree of correspondence” between theories and 
physical reality; these theories aim at full correspondence.1 In other 
words, scientific theories are not assumed to represent human-made 
generalizations based on covariations between appearances with no 
necessary connection to the reality that underlies these connections. 
On the contrary, the aim of sciences has become to understand exactly 
what Thurstone, Pearson and other statistical theorists did not aim 
at – to understand phenomena as they exist, not as they seem to us.
Statistical theories of mechanisms depend on postulates that are not 
grounded and on conditions that are not satisfied
Modern  quantitative  psychology  may  sometimes  claim  that  its 
aims are similar to modern biology or physics – the discovery of the 
mechanisms that underlie the appearances, the observable behaviors. 
1I am not going here into philosophical question whether such full correspondence 
can be known in principle. I agree that we can never be sure that out theories are 
correct (cf., e.g., Engels, 1996; Kant, 2007). I only suggest that theories can be in full 
correspondence with the physical reality even though we cannot demonstrate it.www.frontiersin.org  July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 29  |  5
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A person answering the same question repeatedly does not neces-
sarily rely on the same mental operations – already second time 
the same question is asked, a person can answer in a certain way 
because he remembers answering the same question before. Data 
encoded as variables, again, do not reflect such qualitative changes 
of mental operations that underlie externally similar answers (see 
also Toomela, 2008, in press-b).
Postulate of interpretability of covariations between variables. 
Modern quantitative psychology also assumes that components of 
mental attributes can be discovered by analyzing covariations of 
variables. This postulate is questionable as well. As a rule, qualita-
tively different wholes emerge from the same elements in qualita-
tively different relationships. Quantitative data analysis, however, 
is not suitable for taking quality of relationships into account.
Human language, for instance, is based on units – words – that 
are composed from a limited number of sounds or letters in dif-
ferent relationships. We can take a series of events, words, and find 
perfect covariation between variables, sounds, in those events. Let 
us take, for instance, a series of events – words – this-shit-hits-pool-
loop-polo. We create the following data-file from our observation 
of those six cases so that variables represent presence or absence 
of letters in each event/word:
  h  i  s  t  l  o  p
this  1  1  1  1  0  0  0
shit  1  1  1  1  0  0  0
hits  1  1  1  1  0  0  0
pool  0  0  0  0  1  2  1
loop  0  0  0  0  1  2  1
polo  0  0  0  0  1  2  1
We could make many different statistical analyses with those data 
and would not get any closer to understanding what is happening. 
Perhaps we would discover that all variables are perfectly correlated; 
we would discover that this data set can be perfectly “explained” by 
one factor, etc. Statistically, such results would be a perfect dream 
for a quantitative scientist. And yet all this would have no meaning. 
The data in the table show where the problem is – first three and last 
three qualitatively different cases are identical after quantification. 
Here we know that the cases are not identical; we do not know it 
when solving usual scientific problems. In any case, quantification 
of data into variables where the possibility of qualitatively different 
relationships between variables is ignored ends up with non-sense 
if qualitatively different wholes emerge from the same attributes 
encoded as variables.
Now it can be objected that such phenomena perhaps are not 
common. Nothing would be further from truth – the world around 
us provides massive amount of examples where the same elements 
in different relationships “cause” the emergence of qualitatively dif-
ferent wholes. The structure of DNA and its relationship to protein 
synthesis in a cell is an example; all chemical substances that are 
composed from the same elements in different relationships would 
be examples; different tools that can be made from the same mate-
rial; different houses that can be built from the same stones; money 
that is earned and money that is stolen is also not the same, etc.
be created for discovering potential differences in externally similar 
behaviors are only qualitative because, as we saw, variables entered 
into quantitative data analyses lack the necessary information.
Postulate  of  continuity.  There  is  another  postulate,  which 
underlies quantitative data analysis procedures. Thurstone, for 
instance, postulated:
The standard scores of all individuals in an unlimited number of 
abilities can be expressed, in first approximation, as linear functions 
of their standard scores in a limited number of abilities
 ( Thurstone, 1935, p. 50).
So, there is a postulate that linear functions characterize relation-
ships between the abilities (i.e., mental faculties) and individual 
acts of behavior. The main question that should be answered here 
is not only about postulate of linearity – the same problem would 
be related to non-linear relationships between variables – but about 
the postulate of continuity that is also made with this postulate 
of linearity. If it would turn out that some relationships between 
events are in essence qualitative then no factor analysis, or any other 
kind of quantitative data manipulation, can reveal those qualitative 
aspects of changes.
Often qualitative relationships hold between events. Lack of 
one nucleotide in a gene may be related to qualitatively differ-
ent processes of protein synthesis, related to that gene. One extra 
chromosome does not just end up with more proteins; it ends up 
with qualitatively different pathologies, depending on the chromo-
some. It is also not meaningful to postulate a continuous quantita-
tive series of events in the following continuum: one chromosome 
  missing – the normal number of chromosomes – one extra chro-
mosome in addition to the normal set.
Postulate of correspondence between inter-individual and intra-
individual levels of analysis. In modern psychology, it is often 
assumed that intra-individual faculties can be revealed by studying 
inter-individual differences. This can be a major problem with all 
theories about individual attributes that are based on studies of 
differences between individuals: differences between individuals 
do not reflect distinctions inside individual minds (e.g., Lewin, 
1935; Epstein, 1980; Toomela, in press-b).
Several quantitative scholars have provided substantial reasons 
why inter-individual differences cannot ground interpretations at 
the intra-individual level. They propose that quantitative analyses 
should be conducted with variables that encode intra-individual 
variability (e.g., Molenaar, 2004; Hamaker et al., 2005; Molenaar 
and Valsiner, 2005; Nesselroade et al., 2007; Boker et al., 2009). 
This approach, however, still assumes continuity and quantifi-
cation. Before analyses of intra-individual variabilities, it must 
be demonstrated that the attributes, which are encoded as vari-
ables, can be quantified at all. The variables that are used in intra-
  individual analyses, however, are usually based on the scores of 
the same tests and inventories as used in inter-individual analyses. 
Therefore conducting analyses at the intra-individual level still 
cannot ground interpretations about attributes of mind. Another 
problem related to intra-individual quantitative approach follows 
from their assumption that data collected over time, reflect qualita-
tively the same processes. This assumption is in many cases wrong. Frontiers in Psychology  |  Quantitative Psychology and Measurement    July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 29  |  6
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sciences are based on Aristotelian epistemology. Furthermore, psy-
chology pretends to be like other sciences and superficially aims at 
understanding reality that underlies appearances. This, however, is 
impossible. We will see that in psychology there is a fundamental 
mismatch between questions asked and methods used to answer 
these questions.
tWo epistemologies
Two epistemologies that underlie different views on science are 
first of all distinct in their understanding of what is cause and 
causality. History of the notion of causality is complex; philoso-
phers, and scientists have formulated a wide variety of theories 
of causation, each substantively different from the others. A nice 
summary of different definitions of causality can be found in 
Chambers’ Cyclopaedia (Chambers, 1728a,b). Under the entry 
“CAUSE”  there  is  First  Cause  and  Second  Causes  and  many 
more. Under the “Causes in the School Philosophy,” there are: (1) 
Efficient causes; (2) Material causes; (3) Formal causes; (4) Final 
causes; (5) Exemplary causes. In the other way, again, “Causes” are 
distinguished into Physical, Natural, and Moral. Or yet another 
way, “Causes” are considered as Universal or Particular; Principal 
or Instrumental; Total or Partial; Univocal or Equivocal, etc. Two 
prominent views on causes and causality are relevant in the context 
of this paper.
aristotle
Aristotle suggested that to know causes means to explain, to know 
“why” (e.g., Aristotle, 1941c, p. 240, Bk.II, 194b). This knowl-
edge of causes is not just knowledge, it is scientific knowledge: 
“We think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause 
(Aristotle, 1941b, p. 170, Bk.II, 94a). So, we can say that the aim 
of sciences is understanding what the causes of the studied phe-
nomena are.
Aristotle distinguished four kinds of causes. In different works 
he described them from different perspectives. I am suggesting 
that Aristotelian philosophy of causality rooted structural-systemic 
epistemology that is followed by many sciences today. Shortly, 
according to this epistemology, scientific understanding implies 
description of the distinguishable elements, their specific relation-
ships, the qualities that characterize the novel whole that emerges 
in the synthesis of those elements, and dynamic processes of the 
emergence of the whole (Toomela, 2009, 2010a). The connection 
of this kind of epistemology to Aristotelian becomes evident with 
the following quote:
All the causes now mentioned fall under four senses […] some are 
cause as the substratum (e.g., the parts), others as the essence (the 
whole, the synthesis, and the form). The semen, the physician, the 
adviser, and in general the agent, are all sources of change or of rest. 
The remainder are causes as the end […]
 ( Aristotle, 1941a, p. 753, Bk.V, 1013b, my emphasis)
So, here we find concepts of parts, relationships or synthesis, 
and whole or form. We also find here another important notion 
for structural-systemic epistemology – emergence or causes of 
change. These four causes are called by tradition that was estab-
lished long after Aristotle’s time, material, formal, efficient, and final 
cause, respectively.
Conditions that are not satisfied. Over the last decade or two, an 
increasing number of substantial problems with statistical data 
analysis have been revealed. Some of them I have already men-
tioned above. But the list is definitely not complete with this. For 
instance, there are fundamental problems of interpreting variables 
that encode behavioral data (Toomela, 2008). The problems with 
interpretations emerge when (1) variables contain information 
about events at different levels of analysis; (2) wrong attribute from 
many that characterize the observed event is chosen for encoding 
into a variable; (3) measurement tool is not sufficiently sensitive 
(i.e., certain behaviors and mental phenomena underlying it exist 
but are not represented in the tools that are supposed to “meas-
ure” this mental phenomenon); (4) the studied phenomenon is 
absolutely necessary and therefore it does not vary; (5) variables 
represent variability that emerges because of the properties of the 
test or questionnaire rather than because the phenomenon really 
varies; and (6) the variable does not encode variability at the caus-
ally relevant range.
Results of the statistical data analyses cannot be interpreted in 
terms of the processes that underlie observed behaviors unless the 
meaning of the variables is clear. This condition is not satisfied 
in psychology. If the meaning of a variable is not clear then sta-
tistical data analysis may end up with demonstrating misleading 
dependencies or misleading independencies. Common textbooks 
of statistical data analysis all agree that discovery of a dependency 
between variables cannot be interpreted causally; these textbooks 
usually do not mention that absence of dependence also cannot be 
unequivocally interpreted – statistical independence of variables 
does not demonstrate absence of causal connections. If neither 
dependence nor independence can be unequivocally interpreted, 
the results of statistical data analyses cannot be taken as evidence 
for or against causal connections.
remark on other kind of questions – questions that cannot 
be ansWered statistically
Quantitative psychology asks questions about patterns of relation-
ships between variables; the main question to be answered by such 
analyses is whether it is possible to identify some faculty, some ability, 
some cause that underlies observed behavior. In the discussion above 
I brought again and again examples from biology and chemistry, 
where the format of questions is different. In addition (not instead!) 
to asking whether a certain cause can be identified,   questions are 
asked about the structure of the studied   phenomena – what   elements 
in which particular relationships underlie the emergence of a whole 
phenomenon that is aimed to understand. Quantitative data manip-
ulations cannot reveal structure because in structures qualities of 
elements and qualities of relationships between elements determine 
the whole.
Altogether, there is not one epistemology that underlies science 
but two; one is looking for identification of cause → effect relation-
ships and the other is aiming at structural-systemic description of 
the phenomena under study (see more on these two epistemologies, 
e.g., Toomela, 2009, 2010a, in press-a). These two epistemologies 
are rooted in philosophy. Next a very short description of the philo-
sophical roots of these epistemologies is provided. It turns out that 
modern quantitative psychology is based on Cartesian–Humean 
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(Hume, 2000, p. 54). Second, causes relative to effects have priority 
in time; cause must precede the effect (Hume, 2000, p. 54). Third, 
the number of causes is smaller than the number of effects; there-
fore many observations of effects can be reduced to a few identi-
fied causes (Hume, 2000, p. 185). Fourth, the relationship between 
cause and effect reflects only relationships between appearances; 
no conclusion about reality that necessarily underlies the connec-
tion can be made (Hume, 1999, p. 136). Therefore conclusions 
about relations between causes and effects concern only matter of 
fact; they concern only the existence of objects or of their qualities 
(Hume, 2000, p. 65). Finally, according to Hume, the relationship 
between causes and effects is only probable (Hume, 1999, p. 115). 
The more often we observe an effect following the cause and the 
less often we observe effect not following the cause, the stronger is 
the impression of causality between the observed events (Hume, 
2000, p. 105).
Taken together, it turns out that Humean epistemology is practi-
cally identical with the modern quantitative science – in both the 
succession of continuous events ground impressions about cause–
effect relationships that can be observed with some probability; 
in both the impression of causal connection is perceived stronger 
when the proportion of observations that agree with one direc-
tion of events (from the supposed cause to the supposed effect) is 
higher than the proportion of observations that disagrees with this 
assumed direction of relationship; in both there can be no evidence 
that absolutely disagrees with some hypothetical causal relationship 
because cause–effect relationships can be observed only in degrees 
and not in necessary all-or-none relationship; and in both it is 
assumed that large number of observations can be “explained” by 
knowing small number of causes.
There is one interesting correspondence more between Humean 
epistemology and modern quantitative psychology. According to 
Hume, discovery of cause–effect relationships is based not on 
deductions or thinking but on “some instinct or mechanical ten-
dency” (Hume, 1999, p. 130). The same can be said about quan-
titative science – the ways by which man-made causes (if to use 
Thurstone’s words) are discovered, are highly mechanical. There are 
algorithms that are strictly followed in calculations of probabilities, 
effect sizes, and all other statistical descriptors of the variables in the 
analyses; there is no adjustment of each particular case of study to 
particular statistical calculations, for instance. In scientific inquiry, 
mechanization leads to dead end because it puts constraints on 
what can be understood in principle.
There  is  yet  one  point  where  the  scholars  who  introduced 
statistical data analysis into sciences agreed with Hume but the 
modern researchers tend (at least implicitly) to disagree. It was 
already discussed above that both Pearson and Thurstone were 
fully aware that statistical theories are about appearances, about 
relationships between observed events; no conclusion can be made 
about the essence of the reasons why the statistical relationships 
between  variables  emerge.  Hume  had  identical  understanding 
of the state of affairs – efficient causality is about appearances 
and not about what he called “secret powers” that underlie the 
observed relationships:
It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great dis-
tance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge 
of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us 
descartes and hume
Two thousand years after Aristotle, we find considerably more lim-
ited views on causality. Instead of four complementary kinds of 
causes only one – efficient causality – is taken.
Descartes and efficient causality
Descartes’ view on causality is fundamentally different from the 
Aristotelian. First of all, he accepts only efficient causes and sec-
ond, these efficient causes are very different from Aristotelian. 
For  Descartes,  cause  is:  independent,  simple,  universal,  single, 
equal, similar, straight, etc.; effect, in turn, is: relative, dependent, 
composite, particular, many, unequal, dissimilar, oblique, etc. (cf. 
Descartes, 1985c). According to Descartes, effects can be deduced 
from causes in a series of steps. The cause–effect relationship, there-
fore, is unidirectional.
Another noteworthy idea in Cartesian epistemology was that 
“cause and effect are correlatives” (Descartes, 1985c, p. 22). In most 
cases, cause–effect relationships are essentially correlations, just cov-
ariations of events; there is, however, the First Cause – God – on 
whose power all causal relationships depend (cf. Descartes, 1985a,b). 
As God’s plans cannot be known by less perfect humans (Descartes, 
1985b), humans can know only correlations between appearances.
Cartesian  description  of  cause  contains  terms  and  ideas 
that we also recognize in modern statistical data analysis. Here 
we find: independent and dependent variables; we find an idea 
of linear (or at least continuous) relationships – correlations;   
the idea that effects can be understood by knowing (efficient) 
causes  –  dependent  variables  or  variability  is  statistically 
“explained,” etc. There are two noteworthy ideas more. First, the 
notion of “relationship” has only one meaning, that between 
cause and effect; no other kind of relationship is important. And 
second, there is no suggestion that qualitatively novel wholes 
emerge from the synthesis of parts. This idea is also similar 
to quantitative thinking in modern psychology. The overlap 
between Cartesian philosophy and modern quantitative episte-
mology, I suggest, is not just a coincidence; it reflects fundamental 
agreement between Cartesian causality and modern quantitative 
approaches to science.
Hume and efficient causality
Slightly different approach to causality, even though similar to 
Cartesian in looking for efficient causality only, was taken by Hume. 
According to him,
Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have 
experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define ac 
cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects, 
similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in 
other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never 
had existed
 ( Hume, 2000, pp. 145–146).
So, cause is an object which appearance is related to the appear-
ance of the other object. Space limitations do not allow going into 
detailed description of Hume’s ideas. So I only mention them 
together with references to specific parts in his works where the 
corresponding ideas have been expressed by him. First, the rela-
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conclusions should be drawn concerning those effects which are 
apparent to our senses
 ( Descartes, 1985b, p. 202).
Taken together, humans can only know what is given for them 
through senses – appearances and correlations of them; they can-
not know reasons that connect causes to effects because they are 
imperfect. Correlations do not allow going beyond observations of 
events; there is no way to know what are the reasons for observed 
correlations but one – God’s will.
Hume. For Hume, too, efficient causality was not related to neces-
sity: “tis possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each 
other […]” (Hume, 2000, p. 116). If there is no necessary relation-
ship between events then it is not possible to know, why the events 
are related because it is actually not even possible to prove that the 
events are related essentially and not by accidents or by mistakes 
of observation. But his reasons for this view were different from 
Descartes’. Hume suggested that God is not knowable in principle 
and therefore the idea of God should not be taken into account 
in philosophy.
Hume suggested, similarly with Descartes, that humans have 
no access to knowledge beyond appearances; they cannot know 
why observed causes are related to observed effects. Human 
knowledge is actually even more limited – it is also not possible 
to be sure in discovered laws; the laws of nature can change and 
what we thought to be a cause may turn out to be the effect, 
or no connection between events would be discovered eventu-
ally (Hume, 1999, p. 115). The reasons of human limitations 
of understanding the world lied for Hume in limitations of 
the human (and animal) mind; world is not knowable beyond 
appearances because the mind is unable to go beyond appear-
ances. Here Hume’s psychology becomes central for understand-
ing his views. According to him, the mind works only on the 
principles of association:
[…] principles of association […] To me, there appear to be only 
three principles of connection among ideas, namely, Resemblance, 
Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect. […] But the most 
usual species of connection among the different events, which enter 
into any narrative composition, is that of cause and effect;
 ( Hume, 1999, pp. 101–103).
So, the only operation available for mind is to form associations 
between observed events as they appear to us. If this would be the 
case, then Humean rejection of the possibility to have knowledge 
beyond senses – his proposition that only efficient causes as they 
appear to us can be known – would be well grounded. Humean 
psychology, however, was acceptable in his time, but not any more. 
The inability of associationism to be sufficient for explaining the 
human mind was established and grounded with empirical stud-
ies almost a century ago. Not only humans, but even apes were 
demonstrated to be able to think in a way that is not based on 
associations alone (Köhler, 1925; see also Koffka, 1935; Köhler, 
1959; Vygotsky, 1982b). The idea that animal mind is based only 
on reflexes and conditioned reflexes, discovered by Pavlov (1927, 
1951) was actually rejected by scholars from his own laboratory 
(Anokhin, 1975; Konstantinov et al., 1978).
those powers and principles, on which the influence of these objects 
entirely depends. […] there is no known connection between the 
sensible qualities and the secret powers
 ( Hume, 1999, pp. 113–114).
Here modern quantitative psychology seems to disagree – on 
the basis of different kinds of statistical data analyses often conclu-
sions are made about exactly those “secret powers.” Psychologists 
today attribute often the statistically “discovered” causes not just 
to man-made generalizations that leave an impression of causality 
but rather directly to “secret powers,” to mental attributes that are 
supposed to underlie the behaviors. It is ignored that behavior is 
not in one-to-one correspondence with psychic reality that under-
lies the behavior; externally identical behaviors may emerge from 
mentally qualitatively different operations and vice versa. So, all 
quantitative theories are only about appearances and not about 
underlying mechanisms because quantification of data into vari-
ables already excludes the information that is necessary for discov-
ering the mechanisms that underlie observed covariations.
Why only efficient causality?
Aristotelian causality distinguished four complementary causes; 
Descartes and Hume, nevertheless, proposed only one. It is also 
important that neither Descartes nor Hume proposed entirely new 
concepts of causality; they took one Aristotelian cause out of his 
four. The reasons why they treated causality only in terms of effi-
cient causes are relevant here.
Descartes.  It  was  already  discussed  above  that,  according  to 
Descartes, understanding of causality is about correlations between 
observed events; correlations do not imply necessity – every appear-
ance can be correlated with every other appearance in principle. For 
Aristotle, causes were essentially constraints – in order to make a 
statue, bronze is used; there are many substances out of which it is 
not possible to make statues. If things have been made according 
to plan, then plan constrained the possible course of events; the 
result did not come out by accident or by chance but was con-
strained by plan before the event took place. Descartes, in order 
to be coherent with his philosophy, could not accept any kind of 
cause as a constraint.
Descartes believed in God, and not just some God, but God 
who is “infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent […] 
all the perfections which I could observe to be in God.” (Descartes, 
1985a, p. 128). Therefore, logically, there can be no causes that 
are constraints because God has no constraints; God is omnipo-
tent. God is the First Cause of everything that is. Effects follow 
from cause by necessity in principle because effects follow from 
God’s omnipotence. Humans, however, cannot know necessity that 
relates causes to effects; for them only knowledge about correla-
tions is available:
When dealing with natural things we will, then, never derive any 
explanations from the purposes which God or nature may have 
had in view when creating them. For we should not be so arrogant 
as to suppose that we can share in God’s plans. We should, instead, 
consider him as the efficient cause of all things, and starting from 
the divine attributes which by God’s will we have some knowledge 
of, we shall see, with the aid of our God-given natural light, what www.frontiersin.org  July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 29  |  9
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between events. Such approach could be fully consistent if it would 
be accepted – as did Thurstone and Pearson – that discovery of 
such relationships cannot be connected to underlying structures in 
principle. Modern quantitative psychology, however, takes methods 
from Cartesian–Humean efficient causality epistemology and aims 
from incompatible with it Aristotelian-structural epistemology. 
Structural-systemic description of the studied phenomena cannot 
be based on quantitative methodology. The histories of biology or 
chemistry which are based on systemic-structural epistemology, 
also shows that majority of discoveries in these sciences have been 
made without statistical methods.
Statistical methods in psychology are inevitable
The  suggestion  to  reject  quantitative  methodology,  I  made,  is 
  conditional – IF the aims of studies would correspond to methods, 
quantitative methodology would turn out to be extremely valu-
able, almost inevitable … for applied psychology. Now we need to 
turn the discussion upside-down. Instead of asking what cannot 
be accomplished with quantitative methods we ask, what it can 
bring to us? The world around us is constantly changing and always 
unique. How to live in the world of unique events? This would be 
impossible – in order to live, all life-forms must be able to react to 
future changes of the environment before these changes actually 
take place (Anokhin, 1978; Toomela, 2010a); foresight must be 
based on generalization and abstraction.
Coherent  systemic-structural  theories,  as  modern  applica-
tions of physics, chemistry, and biology amply demonstrate, are 
extremely practical. But how to behave if the theory about under-
lying processes has not been created yet? Here quantitative meth-
ods become valuable: it is possible to create useful generalizations 
without knowing the processes that underlie the events. This was 
exactly what Thurstone, for instance, aimed at:
It is the faith of all science that an unlimited number of phenomena 
can be comprehended in terms of a limited number of concepts or 
ideal constructs. Without this faith no science could ever have any 
motivation. To deny this faith to affirm the primary chaos of nature 
and the consequent futility of scientific effort
 ( Thurstone, 1935, p. 44).
Thurstone, as we saw above, aimed explicitly and only at dis-
covering ways to comprehend nature by describing regularities 
among observed events; these discoveries would be just man-made 
schemes, and yet they would help to manage otherwise unmanage-
able amount of information. A lot could be learned in this way – it 
would be possible to discover behaviors that should be avoided and 
behaviors that should be repeated in appropriate conditions – and 
all this without necessarily knowing, why. Until systemic-structural 
theories replace associative quantitative theories, psychology can 
create increasingly strong ground to applied uses of it. Quantitative 
science is inevitable for applied purposes until a theory about struc-
tures that underlie behavior is sufficiently developed for grounding 
applied uses. If, however, quantitative science continues to look for 
what it cannot find – the “secret powers” – then it ends up where 
Hume warned us not to go:
We are got into a fairy land, long ere we have reached the last steps 
of our theory […]
 ( Hume, 1999, p. 142).
modern quantitative psychology – mix of tWo incompatible 
epistemologies
Psychology today often aims at understanding structures that 
underlie observed behaviors. This aim is borrowed from that 
Aristotelian structural-systemic epistemology. Methods chosen 
for studies, however, are based on Cartesian–Humean cause–
effect epistemology. Both philosophers who limited understand-
ing of causality to efficient causality – Descartes and Hume – and 
scholars who introduced quantitative methods into sciences – 
Pearson and Thurstone – agreed that method of associating events 
by contiguity and covariation cannot ground interpretations in 
terms of underlying necessary reasons that connect observed 
causes to observed effects. They all also agreed that what is rep-
resented in observed associations between events or variables is 
subject to doubt. Interpretation of those associations can be only 
weaker or stronger depending on the relative frequency of events 
that correspond to certain idea of causality to the frequency of 
observations that contradict it. Laws discovered by such pro-
cedures are therefore not absolute but relative; laws cannot be 
refuted by observations that contradict it – in psychology effect 
sizes 1.0 are practically never observed; it is actually conveniently 
accepted that far-going conclusions can be made when 10–30% 
of data variability is statistically “explained.” It is ignored that 
in such situations substantial number of cases disagrees com-
pletely with the conclusions of the study. After conducting some 
“meta-analysis” it often turns out that the laws of association 
discovered in different studies contradict; and a new law can be 
proposed to replace those from the analyzed studies. It would 
not become a surprise when some meta-meta-analysis would yet 
lead to different generalization. Laws, in this epistemology, are 
not absolute; they can change without destroying the theory that 
is built from the collection of associative generalizations. Some 
philosophers would suggest that this kind of activity is not what 
science should do:
For it is an important postulate of scientific method that we should 
search for laws with an unlimited realm of validity. If we were to 
admit laws that are themselves subject to change, change could never 
be explained by laws. It would be the admission that change is simply 
miraculous. And it would be the end of scientific progress; for if 
unexpected observations were made, there would be no need to 
revise our theories: the ad hoc hypothesis that the laws have changed 
would “explain” everything
 ( Popper, 2002, p. 95).
Statistical methods in psychology are useless
Taken  together,  there  are  reasons  to  suggest  that  quantitative 
methods are useless for psychology – IF the aim of psychology 
is to develop knowledge about mind, about “secret powers” that 
underlie observed behaviors. Such understanding would require 
qualitative approaches that allow distinguishing between exter-
nally similar behaviors based on internally different mental proc-
esses; and between externally different behaviors that are based on 
similar mechanisms.
Modern quantitative psychology is based on the epistemology 
where the questions are asked about efficient causality; expla-
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So, mathematics is a system of propositions that begins with 
a set of undefined assumptions, called axioms or postulates; and 
there are rules of deduction or a system of logic. Thus, mathematics 
defines a priori certain principles which are not derived from the 
studies of the world but attributed to it before studies. Mathematical 
description of the concrete real-world phenomena is successful only 
if the concrete system of things satisfies the fundamental assump-
tions of mathematics (Veblen and Young, 1910). Even though 
axioms can be postulated on the basis of scientific studies of the 
world and added to the basic set of abstract axioms, the abstract 
basis of mathematics is nevertheless determined before the studies. 
Taken together, it can be said that mathematics does not study the 
world but rather searches for events where the world corresponds 
to abstract mathematical principles – principles that cannot be 
proven or even defined.
Mathematics  studies  only  formal  aspects  of  the  world.  For 
Poincare, “mathematics is the art of giving the same name to differ-
ent things” (Poincare, 1914, p. 34; also: “Mathematics teaches us, in 
fact, to combine like with like,” Poincare, 1905, p. 159). Similarities 
of things can be discovered by studying relationships:
Mathematicians do not study objects, but the relations between 
objects; to them it is a matter of indifference if these objects are 
replaced by others, provided that the relations do not change. Matter 
does not engage their attention, they are interested by form alone
 ( Poincare, 1905, p. 20).
Thus, similarities of things discovered by mathematical studies 
are purely mathematical – things are similar if the mathemati-
cal  relationships  that  describe  them  formally  are  similar. And 
the essence of these mathematical relationships, we saw above, is 
defined a priori and not derived from scientific studies.
Here are the reasons why not only statistics but any mathemati-
cal approach – if mathematics is defined as described above – is 
unable to reveal the structure of the things and phenomena studied; 
mathematics cannot in principle answer the questions structural-
systemic science aims to answer – what is the studied thing or 
phenomenon? First, in the world, externally similar things and phe-
nomena can be based on different underlying structures; for math-
ematics these structural differences do not exist. If, for instance, in a 
similar threatening situation one person reacts aggressively because 
he has made a conscious choice and the other impulsively, then for 
mathematics these two reactions are the same even though in the 
first case psychological structure included rational processes and in 
the other it did not. Mathematical prediction of future in such case 
cannot be very accurate because a person who chooses rationally 
to react aggressively in certain situations is also able to control his 
reactions whereas impulsive behavior is directed by the situation. 
This problem of mathematics has been recognized by mathemati-
cians themselves; Poincare, for instance, suggested:
It is not enough that each elementary phenomenon should obey 
simple laws: all those that we have to combine must obey the same 
law; then only is the intervention of mathematics of any use. […] 
It is therefore, thanks to the approximate homogeneity of the mat-
ter  studied  by  physicists,  that  mathematical  physics  came  into 
existence. In the natural sciences the following conditions are no 
longer to be found: – homogeneity, relative independence of remote 
parts, simplicity of the elementary fact; and that is why the student 
Some notes on mathematical psychology in general
Mathematical psychology is not based exclusively on statisti-
cal methods. Perhaps non-statistical mathematical psychology 
is better suited for discovering the structure of mind? Indeed, 
from a certain perspective, it seems that mathematical psychol-
ogy is doing well – there are fields of studies where mathemati-
cal psychology is prospering: foundational measurement theory, 
signal detection theory, decision theory, psychophysics, neural 
modeling, information processing approach, and learning the-
ory (Townsend, 2008). Sometimes it almost seems that the only 
true science is based on mathematics; so Townsend suggests 
that psychology undergraduate training should change toward 
“solid-science” education and in order to do that, “The only 
practical solution I can espy is for psychology departments to 
offer a true scientific psychology track, with mandatory courses 
in the sciences, mathematics and statistics” (Townsend, 2008, p. 
275, my emphasis).
A small problem can be that achievements of mathematics, 
such  as  axiomatic  measurement  theory  and  computer-based, 
non-metric model fitting techniques, do not have an impact on 
psychology these “revolutions” deserve (Cliff, 1992). It might be 
that many problems will be solved with some developments in 
mathematics which, for instance, would explicate relationships 
between ways of describing randomness and ways of describ-
ing structure (Narens and Luce, 1993; Luce, 1999). It might be, 
however, that mathematics as such is inappropriate for answering 
questions psychology aims at answering. The most fundamental 
issue is not how mathematics should be applied in psychology but 
rather whether it can be applied for answering the core question 
of the science of psyche – what is mind? No development in any 
kind of measurement theory, for instance, will be helpful if psy-
chological attributes cannot be measured in principle; there are 
strong reasons to suggest that they are not indeed (Valsiner, 2005; 
Trendler, 2009; Michell, 2010).
In order to proceed, a definition of mathematics is needed. 
According to Luce (1995, p. 2):
Mathematics studies structures and patterns described by systems 
of propositions relating aspects of entities in question. Deriving 
logically true statements from sets of assumed statements (often 
called axioms), uncovering symmetries and patterns, and evolv-
ing  and  understanding  general  structures  are  the  concerns  of 
mathematicians.
It is noteworthy that the term “structure” does not apply directly 
to the things and phenomena studied by physics, biology, psychol-
ogy, or any other science. Rather, mathematics studies descrip-
tions of objects and phenomena – systems of propositions – and 
“structure”  refers  to  the  system  of  descriptions;  in  that  sense 
mathematics is an abstract science (Veblen and Young, 1910); it 
is a body of theorems deduced from a set of axioms (Veblen and 
Whitehead, 1932).
It is important that, as an abstract science, mathematics is based 
on assumptions, its “starting point” is
a set of undefined elements and relations, and a set of unproven 
propositions involving them; and from these all other propositions 
(theorems) are to be derived by the methods of formal logic
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  redefinition of what mathematics is; because structural model based 
on studies of things, such as a model of atom, gene, wristwatch, or 
mind, is not based on a set of a priori given assumptions-axioms 
but rather on studies of the world. As Poincare suggested, science 
can be based on different kinds of generalizations and mathematical 
generalization that fits so well into physics, is considerably less use-
ful in other sciences. I will discuss briefly the methods of scientific 
generalization in the next section.
Altogether, there are reasons to suggest that mathematics is 
not appropriate tool if the aim of science is to understand what 
the studied thing or phenomenon is. For mathematical psycholo-
gist, naturally, mathematics is almost the most important tool 
for science:
Mathematical psychology has arguably accelerated the evolution 
of psychology and allied disciplines into rigorous sciences many 
times over their likely progress in its absence. Let’s nurture and 
strengthen it
 ( Townsend, 2008, p. 279).
I suggest that mathematics has actually had the opposite role 
for psychology – it has oversimplified theories, blinded scien-
tists, and directed their attention to the study of relationships 
between things and phenomena instead of guiding them to study 
what these things and phenomena are. Physics has been most 
successful not where something can be exactly calculated but 
where the theory has defined what the things are, atoms, for 
instance. Yes, mathematics is useful tool here and there – as it 
can be also for psychology for grounding practical decisions – 
but no machine has been ever built on the basis of mathematical 
formulas alone whereas many of them have been constructed 
completely without any aid from mathematics. The same can 
be said about   biology – it is very powerful science not because 
of applications of mathematics in some peripheral matters of 
biology but because of the theories about what are cells, com-
ponents of cells, organs, organisms, etc. Perhaps what should be 
“nurtured and strengthened” in psychology is not mathematical 
psychology but studies that aim to understand what mind is.
if not mathematics, then What?
So, mathematics is a useful tool for generalizations about rela-
tionships between events. The value of mathematics, though, is 
not the same in all sciences. Poincare, for instance, suggested that 
mathematics is very useful tool for generalization of the results of 
experiments in physics:
It might be asked, why in physical science generalisation so read-
ily takes the mathematical form. The reason is now easy to see. 
It is not only because we have to express numerical laws; it is 
because the observable phenomenon is due to the superposition 
of a large number of elementary phenomena which are all simi-
lar to each other; and in this way differential equations are quite 
naturally introduced
 ( Poincare, 1905, p. 158).
He also suggested, as was discussed above, that mathematical 
generalization is appropriate only in cases when the matter studied 
by the scientists is homogeneous; when parts are relatively inde-
pendent and elementary facts are simple. These conditions are not 
of natural science is compelled to have recourse to other modes of 
generalisation
 ( Poincare, 1905, pp. 158–159, my emphasis).
In fact, Trendler (2009) proposed essentially the same reason why 
psychological attributes cannot be measured – in case of psychologi-
cal attributes there are too many sources of systematic errors that 
cannot be controlled experimentally; in other words – psychological 
attributes are not independent but depend on each other. Therefore 
they cannot be measured.
Next, mathematics is a secondary science; the successful applica-
tion of mathematics to the phenomena of the world depends on 
the experiments conducted in other sciences:
Experiment is the sole source of truth. It alone can teach us some-
thing new; it alone can give us certainty
 ( Poincare, 1905, p. 140).
Mathematics can help to organize the results of experiments; it 
can direct generalization; but it does not provide any new knowl-
edge (Poincare, 1905). There are two different problems here. One 
problem is related to the essence of generalization. In mathemat-
ics, generalization is related to relationships between events, but 
in order to understand what a thing is, it is not sufficient to know 
with what else it can be related. In principle, there is no constraint 
on the number of other things with which any given thing in the 
world can be related; but what the thing is, is defined qualitatively 
and is fully constrained. A thing is what it is. Mathematical gener-
alizations are not useful for discovering what things are. Another 
problem with mathematical generalizations can also be related 
to Poincare’s discussion of the role of mathematics in sciences. 
According to him,
It is clear that any fact can be generalised in an infinite number of 
ways, and it is a question of choice. The choice can only be guided 
by considerations of simplicity
 ( Poincare, 1905, p. 146).
In case of phenomena that can be – in psychology they are – 
externally similar but yet based on qualitatively different psychic 
structures, the assumption of simplicity is not just wrong – it is 
fundamentally misleading. The assumption of simplicity forces 
scientists who rely on mathematics to ignore what should be studied 
and understood – complexity. Parenthetically, it should be men-
tioned here that mathematical models can be extremely complex; 
but they are fundamentally oversimplified if there is an assumption 
that externally similar events are all based on similar structures.
Third, mathematics can model only what is given by experi-
ments and observations conducted in other sciences. It follows that 
mathematics is not able to provide any understanding of becoming, 
of emergence of qualitatively novel things. If these other sciences 
have described the emergence of novel qualities, this emergence 
can be modeled mathematically in principle. But again, what is 
modeled is not the novel thing or phenomenon itself – that model 
would be structural description of the thing or phenomenon – but 
relationships between events, i.e., what is modeled mathematically 
is always external to the thing itself. Here mathematicians perhaps 
could object and suggest that structural theory is also mathemati-
cal model. This suggestion, however, would require fundamental Frontiers in Psychology  |  Quantitative Psychology and Measurement    July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 29  |  12
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Taken together, mathematics is not useful for discovering what 
things are. For such discoveries, observations and analytic experi-
ments should be combined with constructive experiments.
conclusions
Science begins with the question, what do I want to know? Science 
becomes science, however, only when this question is justified and 
the appropriate methodology is chosen for answering the research 
question. Research question should precede the other questions; 
methods  should  be  chosen  according  to  the  research  question 
and not vice versa. Modern quantitative psychology, though, has 
accepted method as primary and research questions are adjusted 
to the methods. It would not be a problem if methods would fit the 
questions about the studied phenomena; but they do not. The crucial 
question that needs to be asked, is – do the answers to the questions 
what, why, and how I want to know, make a coherent theoretically 
justified whole? All psychology that aims at understanding the struc-
ture of mind with any kind of mathematical tools has to admit that 
the methods do not correspond to the study questions.
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that is based on Cartesian–Humean thinking. The first aims at 
understanding the structure that underlies the processes leading 
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claim made about processes that underlie the appearances.
Quantitative methods are useful for generalizations about the 
relationships between things and events. What the studied things 
or phenomena are cannot be revealed by such methods. Structural-
systemic science, which aims at understanding structures, relies on 
qualitative methodology that includes, in addition to the observa-
tions and analytic experiments, constructive experiments.
met in psychology. Therefore another way for generalization must 
be found. Another way for scientific generalization is a special kind 
of experiment.
Usually it is thought that there is one kind of experiments. This 
kind is Cartesian–Humean; the question answered in the experi-
ment is whether certain event is or is not an efficient cause of 
another event. In order to answer this question, the artificial situ-
ation is created where, ideally, all conditions are kept equal but one 
that is manipulated or “controlled.” If the expected effect follows 
when manipulated event is present and does not follow when the 
manipulated event is absent, then it is concluded that the cause of 
the event has been identified.
There is, however, another kind of experiment that, to the best 
of my knowledge, was first brought into the theory of scientific 
experimentation by Engels (even though in several respects similar 
idea can be found already in Aristotle’ s works; cf. Aristotle, 1941a, 
p. 690, Bk.I, 981a–981b). Engels discussed the role of induction in 
scientific discoveries and proposed that there is much more power-
ful way for scientific proofs than induction:
A striking example of how little induction can claim to be the sole 
or even the predominant form of scientific discovery occurs in ther-
modynamics: the steam-engine provided the most striking proof 
that one can impart heat and obtain mechanical motion. 100,000 
steam-engines did not prove this more than one, but only more and 
more forced the physicists into the necessity of explaining it. […] 
The empiricism of observation alone can never adequately prove 
necessity. Post hoc but not propter hoc. […] But the proof of necessity 
lies in human activity, in experiment, in work: if I am able to make 
the post hoc, it becomes identical with the propter hoc.
 ( Engels, 1987, pp. 509–510)
This kind of experiment that follows from the principles out-
lined by Engels, I have called “constructive” (Toomela, in press-a). 
In constructive experiments it is attempted to create the thing or 
phenomenon that is studied. If the phenomenon or thing can be 
constructed on the basis of knowledge about hypothetical elements 
and specific relationships between them, the experiment has pro-
vided corroborating evidence for the theory. Here the result of the 
experiment – constructed thing or phenomenon – follows from 
theory. It is important that there is no logical necessity that a whole 
with certain emergent properties must emerge when theoretically 
defined elements are put into certain relationships. Instead of logi-
cal deduction, the necessity is proven in the real construction of the 
phenomenon that is attempted to understand. Mathematics derives 
logically true statements from assumptions that cannot be proven. 
It is important that the truth of logical derivations depends fully 
on the truth of the assumptions. If even one assumption cannot 
be proven, there is no proof possible for the scientific theory as 
a whole as well. In constructive experiments, on the other hand, 
the proof is obtained by actual construction of the studied thing. www.frontiersin.org  July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 29  |  13
Toomela  Quantitative methods in psychology
On a generalised theory of alternative 
inheritance, with special reference to 
Mendel’s laws. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. 
Lond. A 203, 53–86.
Pearson,  K.,  and  Lee,  A.  (1900). 
Mathematical contributions to the 
theory of evolution. VIII. On the 
inheritance of characters not capable 
of exact quantitative measurement. 
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A 195, 
79–150.
Pearson, K., Lee, A., and Bramley-Moore, 
L. (1899). Mathematical contributions 
to the theory of evolution. VI. Genetic 
(reproductive) selection: Inheritance 
of fertility in man, and of fecundity 
in thoroughbred racehorses. Philos. 
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A 192, 257–330.
Poincare,  H.  (1905).  Science  and 
Hypothesis. London: Walter Scott 
Publishing.
Poincare, H. (1914). Science and Method. 
New York: Cosimo.
Popper,  K.  (2002).  The  Poverty  of 
Historicism. (First English edition pub-
lished in 1957). London: Routledge 
Classics.
Thurstone, L. L. (1935). The Vectors of 
Mind: Multiple-Factor Analysis for the 
Isolation of Primary Traits. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Thurstone, L. L. (1948). Psychological 
implications of factor analysis. Am. 
Psychol. 3, 402–408.
Toomela, A. (2008). Variables in psychol-
ogy: a critique of quantitative psychol-
ogy. Integr. Psychol. Behav. Sci. 42, 
245–265.
Toomela, A. (2009). “How methodol-
ogy became a toolbox - and how it 
escapes from that box,” in Dynamic 
Process Methodology in the Social 
and Developmental Sciences, eds J. 
Valsiner, P. Molenaar, M. Lyra and N. 
Chaudhary (New York: Springer), pp. 
45–66.
Toomela, A. (2010a). Biological roots of 
foresight and mental time travel. Integr. 
Psychol. Behav. Sci. 44, 97–125.
Toomela, A. (2010b). “Modern mainstream 
psychology is the best? Noncumulative, 
historically blind, fragmented, atheo-
retical,” in Methodological Thinking in 
Psychology: 60 Years Gone Astray? eds 
A. Toomela and J. Valsiner (Charlotte, 
NC: Information Age Publishing), pp. 
1–26.
Toomela, A. (in press-a). “Guesses on 
the future of cultural psychology: 
past, present, and past,” in Oxford 
Handbook of Culture and Psychology, 
ed.  J.  Valsiner  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press).
Toomela, A. (in press-b). “Methodology 
of idiographic science: limits of single-
case studies and the role of typology,” 
in Yearbook of Idiographic Science, 
Vol.  2, eds S. Salvatore, J. Valsiner, 
Luria, A. R. (1948). Vosstanovlenije 
funkcii mozga posle vojennoi travmy. 
(Restoration of Brain Functions After 
War Trauma. In Russian). Moscow: 
Izdatel’stvo Akademii Medicinskih 
Nauk SSSR.
Michell, J. (2000). Normal science, 
  pathological science and psychomet-
rics. Theory Psychol. 10, 639–667.
Michell, J. (2010). “The quantity/qual-
ity interchange: a blind spot on the 
highway of science,” in Methodological 
Thinking in Psychology: 60 Years Gone 
Astray? eds A. Toomela and J. Valsiner 
(Charlotte, NC: Information Age 
Publishing).
Molenaar, P. C. M. (2004). A Manifesto 
on psychology as idiographic science: 
bringing the person back into sci-
entific psychology, this time forever. 
Measurement 2, 201–218.
Molenaar, P. C. M., and Valsiner, J. (2005). 
How generalization works through the 
single case: a simple idiographic proc-
ess analysis of an individual psycho-
therapy. Int. J. Idiographic Sci. Article 
1. Retrieved October 25 2005 from 
http://www.valsiner.com/ articles/
molenvals.htm
Narens, L., and Luce, R. D. (1993). Further 
comments on the “nonrevolution” 
arising from axiomatic measurement 
theory. Psychol. Sci. 4, 127–130.
Nesselroade, J. R., Gerstorf, D., Hardy, S. 
A., and Ram, N. (2007). Idiographic 
filters for psychological constructs. 
Measurement 5, 217–235.
Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Lekcii o rabote bol’shikh 
polusharii golovnogo mozga. (Lectures 
on the work of the hemispheres of the 
brain.). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoje 
Izdatel’stvo.
Pavlov, I. P. (1951). Dvatcatilet’nii opyt 
ob’jektivnogo izuchenija vyshei nervnoi 
dejatel’nosti (povedenija zhivotnykh). 
Moscow: Medgiz.
Pearson, K. (1896). Mathematical con-
tributions to the theory of evolution. 
III. Regression, heredity, and pan-
mixia. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A 
187, 253–318.
Pearson, K. (1899). Mathematical contri-
butions to the theory of evolution. V. 
On the reconstruction of the stature 
of prehistoric races. Philos. Trans. R. 
Soc. Lond. 192, 169–244.
Pearson, K. (1902). On the systematic 
fitting of curves to observations 
and measurements. Biometrika, 1, 
265–303.
Pearson, K. (1903–1904). Mathematical 
contributions to the theory of evolu-
tion. XII. On a generalised theory of 
alternative inheritance, with special 
reference to Mendel’s laws. Proc. R. Soc. 
Lond. 72, 505–509.
Pearson, K. (1904). Mathematical contri-
butions to the theory of evolution. XII. 
M. A., Benders, G. A., Montague, M. G., 
Ma, L., Moodie, M. M., Merryman, C., 
Vashee, S., Krishnakumar, R., Assad-
Garcia, N., Andrews-Pfannkoch, C., 
Denisova, E. A., Young, L., Qi, Z.-Q., 
Segall-Shapiro, T. H., Calvey, C. H., 
Parmar, P. P., Hutchison, III, C. A., 
Smith, H. O., and Venter, J. C. (2010). 
Creation of a   bacterial cell controlled 
by a chemically synthesized genome. 
Science 329, 52–56.
Gigerenzer, G. (1991). From tools to 
theories: a heuristic of discovery in 
cognitive psychology. Psychol. Rev. 
98, 254–267.
Gigerenzer, G. (1993). “The superego, the 
ego, and the id in statistical reasoning,” 
in A Handbook for Data Analysis in the 
Behavioral Sciences: Methodological 
Issues, eds G. Keren and C. Lewis 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates), pp. 311–339.
Hamaker, E. L., Dolan, C. V., and Molenaar, 
P. C. M. (2005). Statistical modeling of 
the individual: rationale and applica-
tion of multivariate stationary time 
series analysis. Multivariate Behav. 
Res. 40, 207–233.
Hume, D. (1999). “An enquiry concerning 
human understanding,” (Originally 
published in 1748) in An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, 
ed. T. L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), pp. 81–211.
Hume, D. (2000). “A treatise of human 
nature,” (Originally published in 
1739–1740) in A Treatise of Human 
Nature, eds D. F. Norton and M. J. 
Norton (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), pp. 1–418.
Kant, I. (2007). “Critique of pure rea-
son,”  (Originally  published  in 
1787) in Critique of Pure Reason. 
Immanuel Kant. Revised 2nd Edn., 
ed. N. K. Smith (New York: Palgrave 
McMillan).
Koffka, K. (1935). Principles of Gestalt 
Psychology. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul.
Köhler, W. (1925). The Mentality of Apes. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
Köhler, W. (1959). Gestalt Psychology. An 
Introduction to New Concepts in Modern 
Psychology. New York: Mentor Books.
Konstantinov, F. K., Lomov, B. F., and 
Shvyrkov, B. V. (eds). (1978). P. K. 
Anokhin. Izbrannyje trudy. Filosofskije 
aspekty teorii funktsional’noi sistemy. 
Moscow: Nauka.
Lewin, K. (1935). A Dynamic Theory of 
Personality. Selected Papers. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.
Luce, R. D. (1995). Four tensions concern-
ing mathematical modeling in psychol-
ogy. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 46, 1–26.
Luce, R. D. (1999). Where is mathemati-
cal modeling in psychology headed? 
Theory Psychol. 9, 723–737.
McKeon (New York: Random House), 
pp. 213–394.
Boker, S. M., Molenaar, P. C. M., and 
Nesselroade, J. R. (2009). Issues in 
intraindividual variability: individual 
differences in equilibria and dynam-
ics over multiple time scales. Psychol. 
Aging 24, 858–862.
Chambers, E. (1728a). Cyclopædia, or, 
An universal dictionary of arts and 
sciences. In two volumes. Volume the 
first. London: Ephraim Chambers 




Chambers, E. (1728b). Cyclopædia, or, 
An universal dictionary of arts and 
sciences. In two volumes. Volume the 
Second. London: Ephraim Chambers 




Cliff, N. (1992). Abstract measurement 
theory and the revolution that never 
happened. Psychol. Sci., 3, 186–190.
Descartes, R. (1985a). “Discourse on the 
method of rightly conducting one’s 
reason and seeking the truth in the 
sciences,” (Originally published in 
1637) in The Philosophical Writings 
of Descartes, Vol. 1, eds J. Cottingham, 
R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (New 
York: Cambridge University Press), 
pp. 111–151.
Descartes, R. (1985b). “Principles of phi-
losophy,” (Originally published in 1644 
in Latin and in 1647 in French) in The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. 
1, eds J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and 
D. Murdoch (New York: Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 179–291.
Descartes, R. (1985c). “Rules for the 
direction of the mind,” (Originally 
written in about 1628, published in 
1684) in The Philosophical Writings 
of Descartes, Vol. 1, eds J. Cottingham, 
R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (New 
York: Cambridge University Press), 
pp. 9–78.
Engels, F. (1987). “Dialectics of nature,” in 
Collected Works, Vol. 25, eds K. Marx 
and F. Engels (New York: International 
Publishers), pp. 313–590.
Engels, F. (1996). Ludwig Feuerbach and 
the End of Classical German Philosophy 
(Originally published in 1888). Beijing: 
Foreign Language Press.
Epstein, S. (1980). The stability of behav-
ior. II. Implications for psychological 
research. Am. Psychol. 35, 790–806.
Essex, C., and Smythe, W. E. (1999). 
Between numbers and notions. A cri-
tique of psychological measurement. 
Theory Psychol. 9, 739–767.
Gibson, D. G., Glass, J. I., Lartigue, C., 
Noskov, V. N., Chuang, R.-Y., Algire, Frontiers in Psychology  |  Quantitative Psychology and Measurement    July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 29  |  14
Toomela  Quantitative methods in psychology
Received: 23 February 2010; paper pend-
ing published: 26 March 2010; accepted: 25 
June 2010; published online: 30 July 
2010.
Citation: Toomela A (2010) Quantitative 
methods in psychology: inevitable and 
  useless. Front. Psychology 1:29. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00029
This article was submitted to Frontiers in 
Quantitative Psychology and Measurement, 
a specialty of Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2010 Toomela. This is an 
open-access article subject to an exclusive 
license agreement between the authors 
and the Frontiers Research Foundation, 
which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original authors and source 
are credited.
eds A. R. Luria and M. G. Jaroshevskii 
(Moscow: Pedagogika), pp. 291–436.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1982b). “Problema 
razvitija v strukturnoi psikhologii. 
Kriticheskoje issledovanije,” (Problem 
of development in structural psy-
chology. A critical study. Originally 
published in 1934) in Sobranije 
sochinenii. Tom 1. Voprosy teorii i 
istorii psikhologii, eds A. R. Luria 
and M. G. Jaroshevskii (Moscow: 
Pedagogika), pp. 238–290.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The 
author declares that the research was 
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that 
could be construed as a potential conflict 
of interest.
chology begins. Qual. Res. Psychol. 4, 
39–57.
Veblen, O., and Whitehead, J. H. C.   
(1932). The Foundations of Differential 
  Geometry.  Cambridge  Tracts  in 
Mathematics  and  Mathematical 
Physics.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 29.
Veblen, O., and Young, J. W. (1910). 
Projective Geometry, Vol. I. New York: 
Ginn & Co.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1982a). “Istoricheski 
smysl psikhologicheskogo krizisa. 
Metodologicheskoje issledovanije,” 
(Historical meaning of the crisis in 
psychology. A methodological study. 
Originally written in 1927; First pub-
lished in 1982) in Sobranije sochinenii. 
Tom 1. Voprosy teorii i istorii psikhologii, 
A. Gennaro, and J. B. Travers Simon 
(Rome: Firera & Liuzzo Group).
Townsend, J. T. (2008). Mathematical 
psychology: prospects for the 21st 
century: A guest editorial. J. Math. 
Psychol. 52, 269–280.
Trendler, G. (2009). Measurement theory, 
psychology and the revolution that 
cannot happen. Theory Psychol. 19, 
579–599.
Tsvetkova, L. S. (1985). Neiropsikholog-
icheskaja reabilitatsija bol’nykh. Rech 
i intellektual’naja dejatel’nost. (Neu-
ropsychological rehabilitation of a sick 
person. Speech and intellectual activ-
ity. In Russian.). Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
Moskovskogo Universiteta.
Valsiner, J. (2005). Transformations and 
flexible forms: where qualitative psy-